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1 INTRODUCTION 
If we take a look at the development of electricity generating wind turbines, in the following 
called wind turbines, from about the first energy crisis 1973/74 until today, 2018, we can observe 
two characteristics – first the typical turbines have grown from a very small size of 40/50 kW 
installed upon a 15/20 meter high tower up to 4/6 MW and towers of about 75/100 meters. The 
second trait is that nearly all turbines made from many different designs during the first 10/15 
years of the period have been converging in their design into accordance with one concept or 
model with three blades connected to a rotor axis which run a generator with a high speed after 
connection of the rotor with a gear in a closed nacelle placed at the top of the tower. In literature, 
that concept is usually called the Danish Concept. 
In the social science literature of technical change which in practice usually has its theoretical 
foundation in economics, mainstream or evolutionary, many results or hypotheses are presented. 
Some examples can be mentioned: 
• There will always be forces to develop and introduce new technologies (products, processes 
or organizational forms) 
• There is a permanent tendency to substitute fixed material capital for circulating capital 
• There is today a strong tendency to substitute or connect knowledge capital for material 
capital 
• Most innovations are very small modification of existing technology, so called incremental 
innovations 
• There are a few innovations far away from existing known technology, so called radical 
technology 
 
In this paper I shall present three hypotheses about innovations – radical innovations, 
incremental innovations and learning experiences from former innovation work.  
These hypotheses shall be tested against empirical material from wind turbine   
history, especially but not only from Denmark. 
 
2  SOME IDEAS FROM ECONOMICS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE  
 
Joseph A. Schumpeter has very often been credited as the godfather of modern economics 
of technical change. However he had his forerunners in classical economics - Adam Smith with  
his factory of pins before and after extended division of labor in The Wealth of Nations1, David 
Ricardo with his new chapter 31 On Machinery in his The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, 3rd Edition from 18212, and Karl Marx with his theory of capital accumulation and  
with the tendency of fixed capital to substitute labor which is analyzed in different parts of Das  
                                                          
1 Adam Smith: The Wealth of Nations. In two Volumes, 441 and 455 pages, Everyman’s Library, Dent and Dutton, 
London and New York, 1964 [1776]. 
2 David Ricardo: The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 3rd Edition, 300 pages, Everyman’s Library, Dent 
and Dutton, London and New York, 1965 [1821] 
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Kapital, volumes 1, 2 and 3 published 1867, 1885 and 18943. 
 
Schumpeter’s contributions were not homogenous during his intellectual life. In 1911 his hero   
was the Industrial Captain who finds a possibility to combine new and old inventions and  
existing  technologies in a new workable technology at an industrial scale and at the same time  
establishes a cooperation with a financial capitalist4. Thirty years after in 1943, he had changed  
this model into a very different model where the hero now is the giant corporation with its very  
big R&D department combined with its detained profits5. From the heroic individual he now has  
changed to the collective organizing and decision - making actor later on called the  
technostructure by one of his students, John Kenneth Galbraith in his book The New Industrial  
State from 1967.6 
 
From Schumpeter’s later works we find that he has his focus at radical innovations – for example  
the railway system. However he mentions also there will come a swarm of small or incremental 
innovations connected to the radical innovation. In the case of the railway system there came a 
lots of improvements of the locomotive, filling water upon the locomotive, the telegraph system  
and so on. Some of these innovations e.g. the telegraph were themselves radical and could be  
used outside the railway system. 
 
A radical invention or innovation is usually characterized with use of natural laws in a new way 
or on the other hand, use of not before used or known natural laws. The locomotive is an  
combination of a steam engine and a wagon with not before foreseen potentialities in that  
combination.  
 
There is another distinction between different innovations. Some are very specific in their 
application. For example a pharmaceutical substance. However there are many innovations  
which can be used in many different applications. They are called General Purpose  
Technologies GPT)7. For example the steam engine can be used as a stationary energy machine  
but also as mentioned above in locomotives. From the end of 19th Century until around 1913  
steam engines were in competition with electric engines as well as combustion engines in cars.  
Steam, gas and electric engines had more market share than gasoline engines in the car market8.   
      
In a real economy investors – capitalists as buyers of capital goods or workers as buyers of 
                                                          
3 Karl Marx: Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Erster Band, Dietz Verlag, 955 Seiten, Berlin, 1966 [1867], 
Zweiter Band, 559 Seiten, Berlin, 1965 [1885], Dritter Band, 1007 Seiten, Berlin, 1965 [1894]. 
4 Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Theory of Economic Development, Transaction Publishers, 255 pages, New Brunswick, 
2004 [1934]. Translated and revised from German Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 1911. 
5 Joseph A. Schumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 451 pages, Unwin University Books, George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd, London, 1966 [1943]  
6  John Kenneth Galbraith: The New Industrial State, 427 pages, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1967. 
7 Elhanan Helpman (Editor): General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth, MIT Press, Boston, 2003. 
8 http://www.autolife.umd.umich.edu/Environment/E_Overview/E_Overview3.htm  
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durable goods e.g.  homes or cars - usually make decisions under uncertainty. Even if there exist 
a known distribution of possible outcomes, that shall usually be irrelevant because the 
purchase situation only takes place very few times in your life. Therefore economic agents are 
risk averse – they prefer certainty for uncertainty even the statistical outcome is the same. An 
investor can naturally choose to make an uncertain investment if the probability multiplied with 
the prospective outcome is so large that it is interesting. 
 
 
3  HYPOTHESIS 1 ABOUT RADICAL INNOVATIONS, HYPOTHESIS 2 ABOUT  
INCREMENTAL INNOVATIONS,AND HYPOTHESIS 3 ABOUT LEARNING FROM 
FORMER INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES  
 
3. 1 Hypothesis 1 
 
Most innovations made inside firms are small or incremental. Radical innovations can sometimes 
be identified. From history the steam engine is one example, the electricity generating wind 
turbine is another and recombinant DNA technology is a third.  
 
There are some common characteristics of radical innovations in modern time. First, the 
probability that an innovator will stumble over a method to transfer DNA from one organism to 
another is zero. The steam engine or the airplane were also results from development of 
theoretical work combined with lots of experiments. A typical inventor/innovator of new radical 
technology will often be a person with scientific competences who has worked with the topics in 
research e.g. in a PhD project or in other research. The organizational framework can be a new 
established firm, a research unit inside a university or it can be a separate unit inside an existing 
medium size or big firm. The important point is that the work can take place without interference 
from people who think they know everything about how to make innovations because they 
probably are competent in making incremental innovations. 
 
Second, radical innovations are very often a result of a very long historical process that maybe 
only consists in combining already known modules. For example, the flight by Wright brothers 
December 17, 1903 at Kitty Hawk in North Carolina, U.S. was collectively a result of a history 
of gliders in practical flight from 1853 and individually the brothers had made many flights and 
experiments with gliders during the years before 1903. The “only” contribution the brothers 
made was in fact to install an internal combustion engine, which had been working in 
automobiles since 1885 to move the plane 20 feet above the ground and at a distance of 120 feet 
during 12 seconds. That contribution was decisive for moving machines heavier than air through 
the air9. In 1895, eight years before the Wright brothers were able to have a plane flying, Lord 
Kelvin made one of his many prognoses in which he said that a machine heavier than air was 
unable to perform a flight according to laws of physic10.   
                                                          
9 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Wright-brothers  
10 https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13556-10-impossibilities-conquered-by-science/  
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Third, the airplane example above shows that even the innovation is important the real social and 
economic effects first will follow later on, sometimes many years after. The diffusion process are 
often the social important part of technical change. Many incremental innovations often 
characterize the diffusion process.  
 
In several cases the radical innovations are so-called General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) 
mentioned above. The technology can have a very broad application area. The steam engine can 
generates mechanical energy in many different contexts from manufacturing, locomotives, 
steamships and automobiles. The recombinant DNA procedure moves DNA material from one 
organism to another. The procedure is common but naturally, the specific character of DNA shall 
be known.    
                                                                        
There are also cases where the innovation can only produce one specific product. For example, 
insulin was discovered in human organism as a stuff of importance for using digested food as a 
source of energy. That scientific discovery was fundamental for later development in extraction 
and cleaning of animal insulin to be injected in human organism and restore its ability to 
transform food into energy.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): during the last three hundred years, scientific and technical trained people 
have made most radical innovations. They can only make such innovations in firms or research 
units with accept from leaders and owners for experiments and mistakes. It will often be in new 
established firms or autonomous units in established firms11. 
 
3. 2 Hypothesis 2 
 
First, we want to consider the incentives to allocate R&D resources into incremental resources.   
In modern capitalism, most markets are more or less monopolistic or oligopolistic. A firm can try 
to conquer larger market shares through a price war towards the other firms in the market. 
However, it will often be a more effective way to win such a war if you can make a better 
product for the buyer and/or make it cheaper. By making small technical improvements, the 
technical risks are small. However, the commercial risks can be more difficult to assess. For 
example, use of gasses (CO2, N2) to vacuum packed food has normally been considered as a 
quality neutral technology. However, it can be more difficult to find out reactions that can be  
expected from consumers. There can be some consumers, which are very positive and shall be 
willing to buy more and pay more. Other consumers are however against the innovation. 
However, as a whole the effects, risks, can usually be expected as moderate.   
 
                                                          
11 I have had some inspiration to this hypothesis from Joel Mokyr: The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the 
Knowledge Economy, 384 pages, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002. Another inspiration can be found in 
Gary P. Pisano: The evolution of science-based business: innovating how we innovate in Industrial and Corporate 
Change, Volume 19, Number 2 (2010), pp. 465-482.   
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From above we can expect that most firms think that the innovations they consider to take 
initiative to realize shall be incremental in technical and commercial sense. In different societies 
and at different times there can be very important differences in attitudes to a technology. One 
example can be mentioned in use of recombinant processes to manufacture a product which 
before has been manufactured by a traditional extraction process in e.g. manufacturing of rennet.   
 
From above we can see that risks probably are small if the changes in technology including 
organization are close to the existing situation. Why are people in an existing firm usually 
supporting such a conservative strategy? An obvious explanation can be that top management 
and R&D personal have been recruited to perform and improve well in respect of one or a few 
products and/or processes. The firm has not allocated resources to think out of the boxes. 
Because such activities are not considered to generate value for the firm. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Well-established firms allocate their resources for technological innovations, 
from R&D via tests, approvals, modification of manufacturing equipment through marketing, 
close to the starting situation.      
    
 
3. 3 Hypothesis 3 
 
Some firms have innovative activities as well-integrated parts of their activities. Pharmaceutical 
firms are always trying to find new medicine, sometimes radical new molecules, sometimes 
improvement of existing medicine. Historically methods used to create new medicine has 
changed. From trial-and-error to advanced biotechnological methods during the last century. 
Scandals with new medicine have been important. Thalidomide disaster that were responsible for 
thousands of deformed newborn children from the end of 1950s and beginning of 1960 was a 
wake-up call and changed the governmental control of new medicine all over the world 
especially in the rich part of the world12. Naturally, innovative pharmaceutical firms also 
changed their internal systems and behavior because of the thalidomide scandal.     
 
It is now an interesting question to ask if companies and other relevant actors outside the 
pharmaceutical industry and health care learned from mistakes and naturally also from successes 
in their innovative activities. There seem to be substantial differences between industries and 
technologies and between different countries. Agriculture, food, airplanes and cars are examples 
of products that in general are regulated and controlled. The mad cow diseases especially in 
Europe from 1984 and the following years came from manufacturing animal food from dead 
animals as sheep and cow that transferred Creutzfeldt-Jacobs disease first to sheep and cattle and 
then to human beings13. The EU and national regulation has strengthened. If we look at the car 
industry, we have had different examples of criminality and bad manufacturing from carmakers. 
In the criminality cases (beginning with Volkswagen and later on other especially German 
carmakers making fraud monitoring in Diesel engines) American university researchers 
                                                          
12 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4737249/  
13 https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn91-bse-disaster-the-history/ 
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discovered the fraud. The cases with bad manufacturing have been existent for many years. Scale 
and frequency of such bad manufacturing cases have grown during the last decade and have been 
found all over the world and in cars made by Toyota, Ford and Volkswagen and other traditional 
well-esteemed firms. In these cases, the initiative typically came from the car manufacturers after 
media had mentioned problems. The stories have typically been followed up in mass media 
because of often very high numbers of cars called back by firms for repair and adjustment.      
 
There are some interesting examples of learning from successful innovations. An example can be 
Danish furniture from 1940s designed by architects employed in the Danish Cooperative 
Consumer Movement and manufactured in factories owned by the consumer organization. The 
furniture was high quality but reasonable low prices because of industrial manufacturing and 
cooperative ownership. After a saturation of the market in the end of 1970s and very high quality 
that meant that the furniture has a very long life the manufacturing closed down. However, from 
about 2010 demand from new generations grew and prices for old items of the classic Danish 
furniture rose. There were in some cases small changes in material and color compared with the 
original classical furniture. The main impression is that there were no changes in the furniture 
assortment half a century later. Sometimes there are no arguments for innovations!14    
 
It shall be noticed that successes and failures in innovations sometimes first can be observed 
several years after they have been taken in practical use. So-called side effects of asbestos, 
typically cancer, were first discovered 30-40 years after persons have been in contact with the   
stuff15. So what was first considered as an innovative success became many years after a very 
big failure.          
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Firms and R&D units try to learn from their successes and failures. 
Sometimes because government and public opinion act to protect other interests than firms 
interest. It shall be noticed that long reaction times can make learning processes slowly. 
 
4  DANISH WIND TURBINE INDUSTRY AS FIELD FOR TESTING THE 
HYPOTHESES 
 
The wind turbine industry is in general suitable as test field for our three hypotheses. We have a 
long history with the first electricity-generating windmill made by Blyth in Scotland in 1887. 
That history is detailed described in technological, economically, politically and socially 
dimensions so we have good data and information for our work. Denmark and to a certain degree 
Germany are the frontrunners in that history. It has to be mentioned that the Danish – German 
cooperation or at least reciprocal information streams started already few years after Poul la Cour 
in 1891 had established the Test Station in Askov, Jutland, close to then Danish - German 
border. He organized the annual accounts was translated into German (not English!).  Albert 
Betz who became famous for his Betz Law from 1919 thanks Poul la Cour for his very important 
contribution to aerodynamics and wind turbine development (Poul la Cour died in 1908 only 62 
                                                          
14 https://www.cbs.dk/en/the-press/news/your-choice-of-furniture-is-a-result-of-the-era-you-live-in  
15 https://www.mesotheliomahelp.org/asbestos/history/  
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year old).  Later on Austrian Ulrich Hütter, working most of his life in Germany with wind 
energy and aerodynamics also in relation to gliders  and planes, was a pioneer in using fiberglass 
to manufacture blades to big wind turbines already in mid-1950s. He taught the relevant people 
responsible for the development and building the Tvind Turbine 1975/78 how to use that new 
material16. Therefore, it is acceptable to use Denmark as a test field for our three hypotheses.  
 
Before I shall look at the hypotheses, there are the two above mentioned main tendencies in wind 
turbine development after First Energy Crisis 1973/74 – 1) The permanent growth in turbine 
effect (and physical size) with a factor of more than 100 up to factor 150 for the biggest 
commercial turbines during the 45 year period, 2) From a situation with many different turbine 
concepts (horizontal or vertical axis turbines, upwind or downwind and many other differences 
in important dimensions) the development has converged towards one dominant concept 
(horizontal axis, three blades etc.) which is the so-called Danish Concept. The permanent growth 
in size of turbines can be explained from the fact that the kinetic energy inside the area swept by 
the blades is π·r2 (r = length of blades) which means that the energy to be harvested grows with 
the square of the blade length. 
 
The development towards one and only one turbine concept, the Danish Concept, can be 
explained from one or two arguments. First from existence of externalities in development, 
manufacturing and servicing, that were growing because the winning concept was early in 
existence when the race between competing concepts began. Second the Danish concept were 
substantial better than the other relevant concepts e.g. the Darrieus concept with vertical axis. It 
had been mentioned in literature that the horizontal turbine was more stable than the vertical 
version. Another thing is that three blades also contributed to stability of the turbine compared 
with other possible blade number especially two blades, which was popular in Germany. In 
literature about the ways, many design concepts converge toward one concept, it is said that 
during the era of concept or standard wars it is more or less accidental which concept will be the 
winner. That war will typically take place after some viable concepts have been formulated. It is 
important to win a strong customer base. The Danish Concept were working in the mainline and 
in practice in the so-called Gedser Turbine developed by Johannes Juul, a student of Poul la Cour 
in 1903-04. Ulrich Hütter’s method for design of blades and use of fiberglass was the missing 
link in the Danish Concept which was realized in the Tvind turbine 1975-7817  His work with the 
Gedser Turbine started up when he became a pensioner. The turbine ran 1957/67 very successful 
without technical problems.  That success had its explanation from security and backup systems 
for all relevant modules.    
 
 
4. 1 Tests of hypothesis 1 
 
4. 1. 1 The predecessors of modern radical innovations 
                                                          
16 Preben Maegaard: Introduction, p. xxix, Preben Maegaard, Anna Krenz,  Wolfgang Palz: Wind Power for the 
World: The Rise of Modern Wind Energy, 642 pages, Pan Stanford Publishing, Singapore, 2013. 
17 Ibid. 
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There were three radical innovations in wind turbines before 1973/74 which is startup of modern 
wind turbine development: 
1) The Poul la Cour turbine 1891 
2) The Agricco turbine 1918 
3) The Gedser turbine 1957 
 
The important characteristic with the Poul la Cour  turbine from 1891 was a new design of  
blades (in Danish called “klapsejler” which means that the blades were like blinds at right angel  
to the length of the blade. They were able to go up and down according to the speed of the wind).  
The shape of the blades came from calculation of maximum of energy transferred to the blades  
from pressure and suck of the wind at the blades. la Cour worked together with two Danish 
engineers H. C. Vogt and Johan Irminger from knowledge about the Bernoulli principles about 
suck effect in opposition to Newton who stressed the point of pressure of the wind18. This  
understanding which was supplemented with experimental work with wind tunnels developed in  
U.K. and in other countries  around 1871 which improved  construction of the blades made the  
energy transferred to the axis and make mechanical energy grow from 6 % of kinetic energy to  
about 24 %. It was a better understanding of aerodynamics which was the important background 
for the la Cour turbine. His turbine was in fact a Dutch Mill with blades modified according to  
the improved understanding of aerodynamics. 
 
The Agricco turbine was developed during First World War by two Danish engineers Johannes 
Jensen & Poul Vinding. It was marketed in 1919. The most remarkably was the blades that were 
shaped in an aerodynamic way inspired from the development of airplanes after the Wright 
brothers especially during the war. The efficiency of the Agricco turbine was 30 – 50 % higher 
than the best la Cour turbines. It came into production but after the end of the war cheap coal 
destroyed the economy in wind electricity. The production stopped in 1925. However, the 
Agricco turbine represented a radical progress in design of wind turbines. For example, some of 
the turbines generated AC electricity and were connected to the grid. We have here a radical 
innovation in technical sense. However, time was not favorable for an effective and modern wind 
turbine because of the big amounts of cheap coal. The technical qualities of the Agricco turbine 
survived during Second World War and in the post-war Gedser turbine. Commercial it 
disappeared in the middle of 1920s19.  
 
The third radical innovation before our period from 1973/74 was the Gedser turbine. The person 
behind that was Johannes Juul. He had been a student as wind electrician with Poul la Cour at 
Askov in 1904. When the expansion in wind energy stopped just after the end of First World            
War he studied and worked as independent electrician for some years until he got a job as 
responsible for the grid in a regional electricity utility (SEAS) South of Copenhagen. After the 
                                                          
18 Guy L. Larose and Niels Franck: Early wind engineering experiments in Denmark, Journal of Wind Engineering 
and Industrial Aerodynamics, 72 (1997), pp. 493-497. 
19 http://runeberg.org/salmonsen/2/25/0229.html, pp. 223-224 (in Danish). 
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end of Second World War, he was able to get support from SEAS for working with two small 
wind turbines. Finally, he got public funding, in fact some small residual funds from the 
Marshall Aid for Denmark, for establishing a big test turbine in the small town Gedser at the 
Baltic Sea. It began to run in 1957 and ran until 1967 without problems20.   
 
The basic idea in the Gedser turbine was to take all the good things from the la Cour turbine, the 
Agricco turbine and the 21 F.L.Smidth turbines built and installed during the German 
Occupation 1940/45.Denmark had no coal and at that time no oil resources, so the big cement 
concern F.L.Smidth had an interest to generate electricity. Because of its activities in 
manufacturing of small planes, it had also some competences in aerodynamics. Johannes Juul 
was also very conscious of avoiding the bad things from the forerunner. His contribution was 
primarily to make a high security turbine. Where he found it possible and important he made 
backup systems to minimize down time of the turbine. He made also an effective blade brake. 
The turbine was a big one at that time with an effect of 200 kW.   
 
The resulting Gedser turbine that had two minor forerunners also made by Juul was in the 
planning phase conceptualized as a downwind two-bladed turbine. However, the stochastic 
winds behind the tower caused several blade failures. He went back to an upwind design with 
active steering of the blades and at the same time to the three blades, he had worked with 
before21. 
 
An interesting observation with the three radical innovations mentioned above is that all the 
innovators were persons trained in scientific and engineering theories and practice (Johannes 
Juul was the only without a formal academic education. He had however the qualifications and 
became in fact appointed to honorary member of one of the two engineering associations in 
Denmark because of his inventions in other fields). It is important to mention that all the 
innovators mentioned besides their scientific competences also were active inventors with 
several patents approved and further were active innovators.la Cour was also a man with strong 
social and political engagement connected to the liberal movement in his time and with its social 
basis amongst the middle-sized farmers. For Johannes Juul the wind energy program was also an 
important part of a fight for national independence.  
 
It can be mentioned that all three pioneers in the first electricity generating wind turbines - James 
Blyth 1887 in Scotland, Charles F. Brush during winter 1887/88 in U.S.A. and finally Poul la 
Cour in 1891 in Denmark  -  were academics. Blyth and Brush were engineers and la Cour a    
university educated physicist. Later on Ulrich Hütter were also educated as an aircraft engineer.  
Jean Marie Darrieus was an aeronautical engineer.   
 
 
 
                                                          
20 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Juul  
21 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gedser_wind_turbine  
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4. 1. 2 Radical innovations after 1973/74 – only in the world of ideas? 
 
During the seventy years timespan 1887/1957 I have mentioned three radical innovations in the 
wind turbine field in Denmark – the la Cour turbine 1891, the Agricco turbine 1919 and the 
Gedser turbine 1957. The two first mentioned innovations were radical based on new scientific 
knowledge in aerodynamics and tested against experiments. The Gedser turbine were more a 
synthesis of the la Cour turbines and the Agricco turbines with some learning from the F. L. 
Smidth turbines during Second World War. There were also some real innovations made by 
Johannes Juul, the man behind the Gedser turbine – for example a brake system with use of the 
blades. The real contribution was optimization of the turbine and the modules. It shall be stressed 
that the Gedser turbine had security and backup systems of the main modules. That were decisive 
for minimizing of down time and therefore maximizing of electricity generation.      
 
Which radical innovations can be mentioned in time after 1973/74? There are many radical more 
or less futuristic ideas, which in principle can be realized. In fact, there are in several cases 
prototypes in use – from Google’s Makani wind kite22, through Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
taking part in a project with a helium-filled balloon lifting a wind turbine to 600 meter above the 
ground23 to Vestas’s Four-in-one wind turbine, a high tower with four rotors each connected to a 
three-blade arrangement. There is a prototype of that Four-in-one wind turbine installed at DTU 
Risø Campus turbine24. In the UpWind project, an EU funded desk project ended in 2011, it was 
concluded that it was possible to upscale turbines from the existing Danish concept and possibly 
to > 8/10 MW even to 20 MW effect25. Naturally it will be necessary to develop hybrid materials 
for blades e.g. from fiberglass and carbon fibers.        
 
Maybe the most radical innovation or rather diffusion of a radical innovation was use of 
fiberglass. A machine to manufacture the material was patented in the end of 19th Century. 
During the following years different types as stone wool was developed and manufactured for 
practical use. During the 1950s the Austrian-German physicist Ulrich Hütter, professor at the 
Technical University in Stuttgart used the material for blades in a 100 kW 2 blades wind turbine. 
At the same time, he was also active in its application in gliders. He had been a key person in 
Hitler’s wind energy project from the end of 1930s until its end in 194226. Ulrich Hütter became 
in 1959 professor in Stuttgart and took up his former work in wind energy27. He had later on an 
important role in Denmark as a consultant to the leader of the Tvind Turbine, Mogens Amdi 
Pedersen, in respect of how to use fiberglass to make the blades and especially fasten the blades 
to the rotor. The construction period of the Tvind turbine was 1975/78. The turbine was at the 
time when it was constructed the biggest turbine in the world with an effect of 2 MW.  Because 
                                                          
22 https://x.company/makani/  
23 https://www.richardvanhooijdonk.com/en/six-futuristic-wind-energy-innovations-will-blow-away/  
24 http://www.vindenergi.dtu.dk/english/news/2017/09/vestas-4-rotor-concept-turbine-one-year-
after?id=e9073604-6ade-4481-865a-c71a067e58d4   
25 http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/files/library/publications/reports/UpWind_Report.pdf  
26 http://www.stuttgart-buch.de/change-in-mobility/wind-as-energy-source.html  
27 Bernward Janzing and Jan Oelker: Hütter’s Heritage: The Stuttgart School, in book from note 16, pp.387-405.  
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of some oscillations, the turbine has had a maximum capacity of 0.9 MW and never worked up 
to the originally planned effect28. 
 
Another radical innovation has been development of a technology to installation of offshore 
wind turbines. The first globally, not only in Denmark, was Vindeby in the Baltic Sea South of 
Denmark in 1991 in very shallow water. The most interesting development in off shore turbines 
is construction of floating platforms. North of Scotland Statoil has installed such a wind farm, 
Hywind, on floating platform29. The technological inspiration comes from oil extracting 
platforms in which Statoil is a very big player.  
 
4. 1. 3 Radical organizational innovations 
 
An often forgotten development of relevance for wind turbine diffusion is what has happened in 
manufacturing process of wind turbines. Already when la Cour lived, he had cooperation with 
two Danish iron foundries, which made standardized cogwheels to the Klapsejler according to 
instructions from la Cour. Local smiths could assemble the components into the turbine30. 
  
In literature, usually the Riisager turbines from 1978 manufactured in five identical exemplars 
are considered as the first serial manufactured turbines, It shall be stressed that modules already 
before were standardized and made in serial manufacturing.  
 
When seven Danish wind turbine firms from 1981 until 1986 exported thousands of wind 
turbines to California, in some cases assembled them there, the need of manufacturing them in 
mass production became evident. It is important to stress that the Managing Directors or CEOs at 
that time in the mentioned firms were self-made people with a background as carpenters, smiths 
or working with machinery used by farmers in agriculture31. They were owners themselves or as 
member of a family owned firm. There were no academic educated people in the top of wind 
firms at that time. It changed after the California gold rush stopped in 1986 and all firms with 
exemption of Bonus Energy A/S went bankrupt. The banks typically claimed changes in owner 
structure to limited companies and professional managers as precondition for contributing to 
reconstruction of the firms32.       
 
The standardization, which was a precondition for mass production, had also another 
consequence, namely the possibility of outsourcing the manufacturing of modules and 
components.     
 
                                                          
28 Benny Christensen: History of Danish Windpower in book mentioned in footnote 16, p. 68. 
29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Floating_wind_turbine  
30 Footnote 16, different places. 
31 Peter Karnø: Dansk Vindmølleindustri – en overraskende international succes. 347 sider. 
1991.Samfundslitteratur. Frederiksberg (in Danish). 
32 Ibid. 
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Mass production was not invented in manufacturing of wind turbines. The inspiration came from 
the automotive industry with Ford T and assembly belt organization 60 years before in 1908. The 
main point was that materials came to worker instead that workers came to materials33. That 
change has contributed to lowering costs per installed MW effect.   
 
Another organizational innovation, which has not been presented as a radical innovation, is what 
has been called Big Data innovation. It is an IT system where all turbines installed by or at least 
manufactured by one of the big wind turbine firms - Vestas, Siemens-Gamesa or General 
Electric (GE) – is connected real time to one or more super computers34. The data are internal 
data from modules in the individual turbine or external data from the microclimate around the 
individual turbine or the windfarm in which the turbine is located. The data mentioned above can 
be used to listen to irregularities in the way the different modules in the individual turbine work. 
Other important information is precise data about wind speed and direction in real time, which 
can be used to optimize location of turbines. These data can be used to manage maintenance 
programs so down time of turbines can be minimized.   
 
4. 1. 4 Conclusion   
 
The technical radical innovations were made by people with scientific and especially with 
technological competences. Even if some of these innovators were not especially strong in 
research they understood science and had especially respect for experimental work in 
aerodynamics. They worked in autonomous groups and had strong enthusiasm for their work. 
 
The radical organizational innovations mentioned above seem to be another thing. They were 
also more copying from other industries than being developed inside the wind turbine industry,      
 
4. 2 Tests of hypothesis 2               
 
As mentioned above the postulate of hypothesis 2 is that well-established firms allocate their 
resources for innovations close to the starting situation. The idea is that the existence of 
idiosyncratic resources, that means resources, which are specific for the considered firm, gives 
an advantage in searching of knowledge and in construction of new knowledge. Often some part 
of that knowledge is tacit knowledge, knowledge that is known and understood by some people 
inside the firm but not shared with people outside the firm. Often that knowledge is not disclosed 
in patent descriptions. It seems evident that there are so-called low hanging fruits, which can be 
picked to a low cost.   
 
An example of such specific knowledge is the blades in Johannes Juul’s Gedser turbines (and 
their two predecessors), First he tried with a two-blade version but discovered that it was more 
unstable compared with a three-blade model. Second, he tried blades manufactured from steel 
                                                          
33 http://corporate.ford.com/innovation/100-years-moving-assembly-line.html  
34 https://www.siemens.com/innovation/en/home/pictures-of-the-future/digitalization-and-software/from-big-
data-to-smart-data-machine-learning-in-windturbines.html  
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but found that they were destroyed in strong wind. The solution became a hybrid consisting of 
wood and aluminum. Third, he changed his wind architecture from being a back- runner to a 
front-runner. The smart thing with a back-runner was that the blades automatically adjusted 
themselves to the wind. The not so smart thing was that the tower shadowed for some part of the 
wind. The solution with the front-runner needed a machine, a yaw to adjust the blades against the 
wind35.  
 
In the examples mentioned above the incremental innovation are maybe first of all not 
innovations but changes in selection amongst different existent technologies. Sometimes with all 
our interest in innovation we forget the core piece in neoclassical textbooks namely influence 
from gains connected to choose one technology before another because of lower unit cost or   
changes of input prices to changes in input combinations.  
 
4. 2. 1 Real incremental innovations after 1973/74     
 
During the time after First Energy Crisis 1973/74 there can be identified two main challenges or 
aims formulated in engineering terms: 
 
1) The continuous growth in size of turbines, measured in potential output of electricity, the 
so-called nameplate effect, the maximum effect of the turbine, from an average of 50/60 
kW and very few test turbines with more than 100 kW effect in the beginning of the 
period. In the end of the period mentioned (2018), there are many different sizes of 
turbines running. The biggest turbines in commercial use are about 9/9.5 MW nearly 200 
times bigger than the average size in 1973/74. It is important to know precisely the 
locations where the turbines are to be installed. For example, it is important to distinguish 
between the heights of the tower because the strength of wind is much higher 100 meter 
above ground than 30 meter above ground.  Theoretical, ceteris paribus, the bigger size 
the lower unit costs of installed MW effect.  
 
2) The other important aim has been to find a way to locate wind turbines offshore, at the 
sea in some distance from the coast. The explanation is the very simple that there is no 
hindrance for the wind at the open sea far away from the coast. In shallow water (< 50 
meters), it is possible to install the turbine at a pile driven down in the sea floor. If the sea 
depth is more than around 50 meter, other solutions are to be developed. Usually it is a 
floating platform technology.     
 
The first aim to let the size of the turbine grow is easy to understand because the kinetic energy  
in wind which is the pool from which the energy is transformed into mechanical energy equals  
the circle area swept by the blades:  
(1)  A = π · r2    
                                                          
35 Footnotes 20 & 21 above.  
14 
 
where r is the length of the blades. The kinetic energy is the square of the length of the blades.   
 
The second aim is to locate wind turbines in locations with high speed and reasonable constant  
Speed of the wind. The power generated is: 
  
(2) P = ½ · ρ · A · v3 · Cp in which the symbols  mean the following: 
 
P    = Power (W) 
ρ    = Density of air (kg/m3), depending of temperature or height above the sea level  
A   = Swept area (m2) 
v    = Wind speed (m/s) 
Cp   = The Power Coefficient is the proportion of kinetic energy transformed into mechanical 
energy (theoretical maximum is the Betz Limit of 16/27 = 0,593, in practice it is today between 
0.35/0.45 and depending of the concrete wind turbine)36.   
 
Of course, it is possible to pursue both aims at the same time – developing and installing still 
bigger turbines and locating them in places with still higher wind speed.   
  
4. 2. 1. 1 Turbine growth 
 
It is remarkable that the growth in turbine size has been continuously during the nearly half of 
century from the First Energy Crisis 1973/74. 
 
One important characteristic of this growth is that in the U.S. it was a comprehensive serial of 
design, manufacturing, installment and running of wind turbines from 1974 until 1992. NASA 
was the governmental institution with overall responsibility for the program. Big industrial 
corporations had a strong influence in the committees just below NASA. After two small 
turbines in the beginning of the period – 100 and 200 kW, the program went up to three very big 
turbines – 2.0 MW in 1979, 2.5 MW in 1982 and 4.0 MW in 1982. The turbines were all two-
bladed, some of them were downwind and other were upwind. In general, the program generated 
much new knowledge37. In respect of practical usable new technological proposals, the test 
turbines were without much success38.  
 
In Germany the few running turbines from which a program started were a small-scale size at 
50/100 kW. The aim pursued was a Big Bang of 3 MW with the Growian (Grosse Windkraft 
Anlage) turbine politically decided and with construction beginning in 1976, started up in 1983 
and decommissioned in 1987. Officially, the aim with the Growian project was to test if it was 
possible to generate electricity from wind in Germany. However, it was explicit formulated from 
the dominant interests in business and electricity industry strongly connected with the nuclear 
power electricity developing and manufacturing industry and generation of electricity that the 
                                                          
36 https://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/other/23-wind-turbine  
37 http://www.wikiwand.com/en/NASA_wind_turbines   
38 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NASA_wind_turbines  
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project should demonstrate for anti-nuclear people and organizations (including the Green Party) 
that wind energy was a very bad idea. These dominant industrial and electricity business interests 
were strongly represented in the Growian steering committee. The Growian turbine became in 
fact attacked by technical failures. There were two main weaknesses – firstly the turbine had two 
blades and secondly the turbine was a downwind back-runner (Leeläufer). The two-blade 
concept was already at that time known to result in vibrations, which claimed stronger materials 
than the three-blade turbine. The back-runner gave less useful energy than the front-runner did 
because the tower shadowed for the wind. The turbine worked 420 hours during its lifetime from 
1983 to 1987. It costed 87 million DM. In general, it was the biggest scandal in history of wind 
energy39.   
 
In Denmark two so-called Nibe turbines were installed 1979/80 (Nibe is a small town in Mid-
Western Jutland). There were two purposes with these turbines. First to find out about the 
possibilities for use of wind energy to generation of electricity, second there should be made 
experiments with big turbines for future improvement of the turbines. There were over time 
several problems especially of technical character. Several component and modules broke down 
before expected. Finally, the turbines were stopped and decommissioned 2001.The Nibe turbines 
were in fact the Danish energy establishment’s answer vis-à-vis the grassroots’ turbines from 
same time. Especially the Tvind Turbine constructed and installed 1975/78 a 2 MW turbine, 
which was the biggest turbine in the world at that time.  It shall be noticed that the Nibe Turbines 
had only a rated effect on 0.63 MW per turbine, 20 % of the Growian turbine40. It is important to 
notice that the Tvind turbine never ran with more than 0.9 MW even it was rated as a 2 MW 
turbine. The explanation was a miscalculation on vibrations of the turbine when the generation of 
electricity was over 0.9 MW41. However it shall be stressed, that the Nibe turbines were not in 
general total failures, but there were several broke downs in modules and components which had 
as result that the turbines did not were running for longer periods. The results in generation of 
electricity became in that way not satisfactory. The commercial results became consequently 
neither satisfactory.  
 
The Danish way to let the turbines grow in size was a Step-By-Step  strategy. The Step - By - 
Step strategy was a result of an energy policy without nuclear power. This strategy had strong 
support in the population but in opposition to the majority of the Parliament. It was the First 
Energy Crisis 1973/74, which changed the balance of power between the two strategies. 
Denmark was strongly dependent of imported oil and coal especially from Middle East. To 
diminish that dependence the wind supporters offered an effective and fast way to generate 
electricity – a wind turbine could be manufactured and generate electricity in less a year. 
Contrary it would take about ten year from a decision to build a nuclear power plant until there 
was electricity from that. 
 
                                                          
39 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Growian  
40 Preben Maegaard: From Energy Crisis to Industrial Adventure: A Cronicle in book mentioned in note 16, pp. 181-
247. 
41 http://dkvind.dk/fakta/M5.pdf . Here the explanation of 0.9 MW is however that there was not demand enough 
from the grid and a want to enlarge the lifetime of the turbine. After a later refurbishment the turbine is still 
working after 40 years. 
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A gradualist developing strategy of bigger turbines can be characterized by the Step-By-Step 
approach vis-à-vis the Big Bang approach. It is an approach, which seems more expensive and 
taking longer time than the American or German Big Bang. To go from 0.2 to 2 MW in one step 
compared with a sequence from 0.2 to 0.5 to 1.0 and further to 1.5 for ending with a 2 MW 
turbine seems naturally to be preferred. In practice, the answer is different. For example, a 
growth in length of blades from 10 to 30 meters is not a trivial matter. The material can still be 
resin improved glass fibers. The design has to be modified in order to get an optimal blade. That 
optimization can be difficult to determine if we only have mathematic models. It is better to 
supplement them with in site experiments. Even today new blades are tested for physical loads 
before they are approved for use in a new serial of new turbines. The empirical tests are in such 
cases more reliable than speculative formalism.   
 
Today Danish wind turbine manufacturers make some of the biggest turbines globally. Vestas 
makes in cooperation with Japanese Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) the biggest commercial 
turbine with an effect of 9.5 MW42. The difference between Danish Vestas and German/Spanish 
Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy (which was Danish Bonus Energy A/S until 2004 and still 
with important developing and manufacturing located in  Denmark) on one side and some other 
German and American wind companies on the other side is not so seriously today as it was 
historically.     
 
Above we have looked at the growth of the turbines from an engineering perspective. What can 
we say of the growth strategy from an economic perspective?          
 
We have above-mentioned potential benefits from growing size of wind turbines. A basic 
question is to ask about costs to achieve the benefits from growth of turbines. From a superficial 
look the wind turbine-manufacturing firms has a low R&D intensity measured as R&D costs 
divided with turnover43. In average around 2 - 3 %. However, the figures are not giving the 
correct picture. Suppliers of modules or components have developed a good part of new 
technology in wind turbines and in manufacturing of these new turbines. For example, the 
development of control systems takes place in specialized firms supplying control systems. 
Statistically the only indicator of these improvements in control systems is the relatively growth 
in prices of control systems.          
 
4. 2. 1. 2 Offshore location 
  
When the offshore wind parks were constructed beginning from 1991, the most important radical 
innovation was clearly the platform technology. A less visible innovation process has taken place 
in nearly all modules and many components. It was clear for the engineers working with 
development of offshore wind turbines that rough climate often hinders access to the turbines 
from boats or helicopters. The minimization of down time of turbines is very important for 
generation of electricity.    
 
                                                          
42 https://www.offshorewind.biz/2017/06/06/mhi-vestas-launches-9-5-mw-offshore-wind-turbine/  
43 https://www.statista.com/statistics/513743/vestas-research-and-development-costs-worldwide/  and 
https://www.vestas.com/~/media/vestas/investor/investor%20pdf/financial%20reports/2017/q4/2017_annual_re
port.pdf    
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After some experiences from real life, it became clear that modules and components shall be 
made of very high quality, reliability, and with long life in order to minimize repair and 
replacement. One of the first examples was a negative experience with the replacement of 
generator and transformer modules in all turbines in the offshore Wind Park Horns Rev 1 in the 
North Sea after defects. What the real background factors were is not clear because there were no 
problems with same type of turbines close to Horns Rev 144. However it seems that saltwater and 
salty air do explain something. There were possibly also some problems with a batch of 
generators.  
 
There is naturally not a free lunch here – a gearless direct drive generator that means less moving 
parts in the generator is substantial heavier than a generator with gear. For the big wind turbines 
with direct drive, the nacelle has a weight of 300/400 tons. That means that the requirement to 
strength of tower and platform will be higher because of the wind hits a higher mass.   
 
The third important problem connected with offshore wind parks is as mentioned above to 
develop floating platforms. There has been several of such test turbines. The only wind park 
installed on floating platforms and running on commercial precondition is the Hywind Scotland 
Pilot Park located north of Scotland owned by Statoil. It began generating electricity in 201745.           
 
Fourthly, it is difficult to come out to the turbines because of the hard weather most of the year. 
It is naturally an argument to use components and modules of high quality and monitoring 
treadles relevant data.    
 
4. 2. 2 Conclusion 
 
Well established wind turbine firms have focused their innovation activities in two main 
directions – enlarging the size of turbines (and enlarging the size of wind parks) and moving 
location of wind turbines to off shore. Even the Step-By-Step strategy has resulted in serious 
mistakes a la Growind there has been problems especially with the off shore turbines. The net 
result has been radical improvement in quality of components and modules. During the last years 
strong growth in productivity in manufacturing of turbines and installment.  
 
4. 3 Tests of hypothesis 3 
 
The third and final hypothesis mentioned above says, that firms try to learn from their successes 
and failures. Sometimes because government and public opinion act to protect other interests 
than firms interest. It is important to notice that long reaction times can make learning processes 
slowly. 
 
                                                          
44 http://www.modernpowersystems.com/features/featurehorns-rev-reveals-the-real-hazards-of-offshore-wind-
720/  
45 https://www.4coffshore.com/news/hywind-scotland-pilot-park-united-kingdom-uk76.html  
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4. 3. 1 Learning from success and failure 
The hypothesis seems immediately to be nearly a banality - individuals, organizations and 
nations will naturally behave in accordance with which behavior results in success and escape in 
accordance with which behavior results in failure (B. F. Skinner)46.   
However, there are several problems with the content in that hypothesis. First we need to make a 
precise definition of speed and direction of technological change. Technological means here a 
product or a process specified in different dimensions. For example, a car with its main modules 
as chassis, engine, wheels, brakes etc. and the way these modules interact with each other is a 
technological product, including naturally the architecture that makes a car. The car 
manufacturing process with workers working along assembly belt, robots and modules is a 
technological process. Speed of such changes can naturally be specified as time from startup of 
the project to achieving the wanted result. Direction is maybe a more complex issue. 
Traditionally it has been understood in a two-factor production context as the relative proportion 
of labor vis-à-vis capital. I propose that we make the distinction capital intensive and labor 
intensive from the monetary figures and then make a more descriptive analysis of the processes.   
What means learning in the learning hypothesis?  Learning is the act of acquiring new or 
modifying and reinforcing existing knowledge, behavior, skill, value or preference that may lead 
to a potential change in synthesizing information, depth of the knowledge, attitude or behavior 
relative to the type and range of experiences. In the simple Skinner version, learning means that 
behavior, which results in success, will be repeated. Behavior, which results in failures, will be 
avoided47. Even we can find many examples confirming this interpretation of the hypothesis, 
there are empirics that seem to be against it. Such cases are probably the most productive for 
creating new knowledge and new technology.  
Some well-known examples are the development and installment of very big turbines around 
1980 as the German Growian turbines, Danish Nibe Turbines and some American NASA 
turbines48.  
         
They were with exception of the first NASA turbines at the time they were constructed, 
manufactured and installed much bigger than the already existing biggest turbines. It is 
interesting that all of them were failures or disasters in technical sense and partly because of 
those failures/disasters commercial failures. However, they were important step stones in 
learning processes towards the much bigger turbines we have today. The Growian turbine had a 
rated effect of 3 MW, the Nibe Turbines 0.630 MW and the different NASA turbines from 0.1 to 
4 MW.  
What the hypothesis 3 mentioned above is not considering is the ways failures can inspire 
learning in the techno structure or innovation system around wind turbines design, construction, 
                                                          
46 https://www.simplypsychology.org/operant-conditioning.html  
47 Ibid.  
48 See footnotes 39, 40 and 41 above. 
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manufacturing and installation. As well known from life and literature, failures can stimulate 
making improvements much more than successful incremental innovations. What was the 
learning effect from the three different cases with very big turbines around 1980? 
The German case was planned to develop the optimal turbine – it is well known that big turbines 
produce electricity as the square of the length of the blades. During the interwar-period, there 
were also activities to construct very big turbines. During Nazi time from mid-thirties until 
around 1942, there were several different activities to enlarge electricity generation from wind 
turbines. As it is well known Germany did not had enough energy resources inside Germany to 
run its industry and at the same time make war with Soviet Union and the West.  
The Growian project had officially the purpose to test if it was a possibility to generate electricity 
from wind in Germany. However, it was in fact more or less explicit formulated, as an aim from 
the dominant interests connected with nuclear power electricity generation in Germany that the 
project should demonstrate for anti-nuclear people that wind energy was a very bad idea. 
Naturally, there were other social forces in German social and political life, which had a more 
constructive attitude. The Growian turbine became in fact hit by technical failures. There were 
two weaknesses – first the turbine had two blades and second it was a downwind back- runner 
(Leeläufer) instead of the upwind concept. The two-blade concept was known also at that time to 
result in vibrations, which claimed stronger materials than the three-blade turbine. The back 
runner gave less useful energy than the front-runner did because the tower shadowed for the 
wind.     
In Denmark the purposes with the two Nibe turbines installed 1979/80 were first to find out 
about the possibilities for use of wind energy to generation of electricity, second there should be 
made experiments with big turbines for future improvement of the turbines4950.There were over 
time several problems especially of technical character. Several component and modules broke 
down before expected. Finally, the turbines were stopped and destroyed 2001.The Nibe turbines 
were the Danish energy establishment’s answer vis-à-vis the grassroots’ turbines from same 
time. Especially the Tvind Turbine constructed and installed 1975/78 as a 2 MW turbine which 
was the biggest turbine in the world at that time.  However, it shall be stressed that the Nibe 
Turbines had only a rated effect on 0.63 MW per turbine, 20 % of the Growian turbine. In 
addition, for the historical truth it shall be stressed that the Tvind turbine has never run with more 
than 0.9 MW even it was rated to 2 MW. The explanation was a miscalculation on vibrations of 
the turbine when the generation of electricity was over 0.9 MW. However it shall be stressed, 
that the Nibe turbines were not in general total failures, but there were several broke downs in 
modules and components which had as result that the turbines did not were running for longer 
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periods. The results in generation of electricity became in that way not satisfactory. The 
commercial results became consequently neither satisfactory.  
 
 
The American NASA programs were in fact a serial of design, manufacturing and installment 
and running of wind turbines from 1974 until 1992.  
 
    ASA/DOE/DOI Wind Turbines 
Model Rating kW 
Swept 
diameter, 
m 
Description Prime contractor 
Years 
in 
service 
Remarks 
MOD 
0 100 38 
Two blades, 
downwind and 
upwind 
NASA design 
with Lockheed 
blades 
1975–
1982 
Prototype only at 
Sandusky 
MOD 
0A 200 38 
Two blades, 
downwind Westinghouse 
1977–
1984 
Four units installed for 
field trials 
MOD 
1 2000 61 
Two blades, 
downwind General Electric 
1979–
1981 
One installed at Howard's 
Knob. World's first 
turbine to achieve 2 MW 
power output. 
MOD 
2 2500 91 
Two blades, 
upwind Boeing 
1982–
1988 
Three installed near 
Goodnoe Hills as a wind 
farm. Fourth and fifth 
units sold to utilities, 
Pacific Gas and Electric 
demolished in 1988 
WTS 
4 4000 79.2 
Two blades, 
downwind 
United 
Technologies 
1982–
1994 
One turbine installed at 
Medicine Bow, Wyoming 
and another smaller 3 
MW WTS 3 version in 
Sweden 
MOD 
5A 7300 121.5 
Two blades, 
upwind General Electric 
 Never built 
MOD 
5B 3200 97.5 
Two blades, 
upwind Boeing 
1987–
1996 
One installed at Oahu, 
Hawaii 
________________________________________ 
51  
If we look at the three mentioned cases above they are in fact not as identical as I first thought. It 
is correct that in all three cases there were serious technical problems. It is also correct that these 
                                                          
51 See note 39 
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technical problems had something to do with the very big size of the turbines compared with 
what was the standard size of wind turbines at that time (< 100 kW). It was probably not only a 
question about size but also maybe more important a question about speed of growth in size from 
one state to another. The problem here is that we cannot expect linear connections. For example, 
the growth in length of blades made new requirements to strength and weight. Until Second 
World War, wood was often used as material for blades. With bigger turbines, new materials 
were sought. Steel and aluminum were favorites. Another material was fiberglass that became 
the winner. It is interesting in respect of material for blades that the new suppliers were 
companies which in beforehand worked with the material. Not specifically with blades. 
Therefore, one of the winners was a Danish company established as furniture factory in 1940, 
which in 1954 manufactured a small sailboat. In 1952, it changed its name to LM Glasfiber. First 
in 1978 it manufactured the first blade for wind turbines. The conclusion seems to be that it was 
more important to be technological strong in fiberglass than it was to be strong in manufacturing 
of blades for wind turbines. That is an important observation, which also can be observed in 
other technologies. It was in general not the former manufacturers of horse cabbage, which took 
over and became manufacturers of cars. It was manufacturers of internal combustion engines or 
other engines.  
However, it is interesting to observe that there are different ways in which the new turbines as a 
whole were designed, developed, manufactured and installed. The big German electricity 
producing companies dominated the Growian organization. Because the electricity industry was 
against wind energy and pro-nuclear power, the Growian project was more or less determined to 
be a failure. 
The Danish case was also strongly influenced from the electricity industry. However, the strong 
grassroots movement was not only customers of electricity but also active in development and 
manufacturing of wind turbines. The many small wind turbines developed, manufactured, and 
installed a little before and at the same time were very visible successes and the big turbines had 
to be compared with. Even the industrial establishment, electricity top and mainstream 
politicians were pro-nuclear and against wind energy, they had to listen to the massive 
alternative sustainable energy forces in Danish society. The fact is that Denmark never got 
nuclear power. The two Nibe turbines had a rated effect of 0.63 MW per turbine. However, there 
were some experiences in Denmark to develop, manufacture and install big turbines. Johannes 
Juul’s Gedser Turbine running from 1957-67 had a rated effect of 0.20 MW and the Tvind 
Turbine had a rated effect of 2 MW even it only worked with 0.90 MW. So there were some 
knowledge about manufacturing big turbines and let them work successful. 
The American NASA projects are in fact interesting in several dimensions. First they represented 
a very strong growth in rated effect from 0.1/0.2 MW in the end of 1970s to a very big turbine 
with an effect of 2 MW which ran 1979/81. The turbines were all two-bladed and some of them 
were downwind and the other upwind.  
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4. 3. 2 Conclusion 
The three examples of mega wind turbines in U.S.A., Germany and Denmark are examples of 
not-learning. They can be considered as constructions, from beginning of 1970s to-mid 1990s 
from the energy-establishment that did not wanted success for wind energy. Later on a more 
nuanced learning of the three examples has been done. The Growian is still a scandal, but the 
American and the Danish cases gave some knowledge mostly from their failures. 
 
     
5  DISCUSSION 
 
It is interesting to notice that the stated aims in the debate in Denmark about use of wind energy 
to generate electricity have changed over time. Poul la Cour stressed from the beginning in 1891, 
the importance of provision of electricity to rural districts of the country. In same year, the first 
DC utility began to generate and distribute electricity in Odense a big provincial town in 
Denmark52.  His argument had relevance in Denmark until about First World War because the 
electricity companies generated and distributed electricity as Direct Current (DC), which could 
only be distributed over short distances, 5 km, before it became transformed into heat. From 
1907, development of Alternate Current (AC) began and there was a system with DC in towns 
and AC in rural districts. During the period, 1914 - 1945 including the two World Wars, focus 
aim became self-sufficiency or diminishing dependency of imported energy fuels. During the 
period Denmark did not had oil resources and during the two wars could only import small 
proportions of normal fuels as coal and oil. Therefore, wind resources were welcome as 
supplement. From 1973-74 the aims with wind energy in Denmark have been a constructive self-
sufficiency answer on the question of future energy and against nuclear power which was the 
other alternative. Additionally wind generated electricity diminishes leak of CO2 compared with 
use of coal, oil and natural gasses. 
 
Poul la Cour understood very well that good science was an absolute precondition to make wind 
energy competitive vis-à-vis other electricity fuels. However, he also knew that grassroots were 
important for the long-term survival of the idea. He started up a Danish Society of Wind-
electricity in 1903 with a Periodical of Wind-electricity. More was needed, namely skilled 
electricians to install and servicing wind turbines. He started up such education. That group of 
people had the relevant competences to make the la Cour turbines run between the wars when 
there were no new installed turbines. An effect was also that ideology and enthusiasm about 
wind energy survived and in fact was decisive for Johannes Juul’s work from the end of Second 
World War and culminated in the Gedser Turbine beginning to run from 1957 and stopped in 
1967. Johannes Juul was as 17 - 18 year young man a student in wind-electricity of Johannes 
Juul 1903 - 04. Even today, we can find a strong interest in wind energy and today supplemented 
                                                          
52 H.C. Hansen: 
23 
 
with interest in solar energy. There are in Denmark today 4 different societies and museums with 
focus at renewable energy especially at wind energy53.   
 
In the text above, I have looked at factors behind allocation of resources towards radical 
innovations and incremental innovations. It will naturally be very relevant to look at which 
factors determine that a new radical innovation will be of social and private importance including 
economic importance. It will be much more difficult to answer such a question. Chris Freeman 
mentions in his first book on industrial innovation the example that artificial leather came to the 
market in beginning of 1950s when Argentina had serious economic problems and expanded its 
slaughtering of cattle. The consequence from that was an expansion of natural leather to lower 
prices than before. The demand of artificial leather declined and first after many years, the 
artificial leather became a viable innovation54. The conclusion from that example is that a radical 
and good quality innovation cannot be guaranteed to be a commercial or social success.  
different concepts in Danish wind turbine manufacturing – the Danish concept were the most 
disseminated. However, the Darrieus concept with the vertical axis were also When we look at 
big well-established firms, it seems in many cases that they are inventive measured by their 
patenting behavior and innovative measured from their new products and processes. However 
often inventions and innovations take place in small new established firms, which are bought by 
the big companies when they have made successful inventions and maybe have started to make 
innovations. It is a smart way for minimizing risk for the big firms – they are screaming the 
successful inventions and beginning innovations, which are very expensive.  The well-
established firms have capital from former blockbusters and monopolistic market position. The 
small firms with radical new ideas do not have or cannot easy get access to capital. 
As mentioned above during the first few years after 1973 -74 there were several popular. 
Probably because it was favored by many senior engineers. For example, the first Vestas turbine 
expected to be brought to market was a Darrieus turbine. After some tests in 1979, it was 
rejected and instead the firm made their first commercial turbine according to the Danish concept 
from a license they bought. In that way Vestas learned very fast from a failure and were able to 
go to America and be an important player into the Californian Gold Rush 1981- 86. It seems that 
the background for the reduction in numbers of firms manufacturing turbines after 1986, when 
the Californian market disappeared until 2004 when Siemens bought Bonus Energy, was not 
quality problems. After the merger, we have only two or maybe 1½ wind turbine firms in 
Denmark because the Danish part of Siemens has diminished relatively after the fusion of 
Siemens and Spanish Gamesa in Siemens Gamesa. It was capital provision problems and large 
scale cost reduction, which made it profitable to merge.   
                                                          
53 Energimuseet i Tange, Poul la Cour Museet i Askov, Nordisk Folkecenter for Vedvarende Energi and Danmarks 
Vindkrafthistoriske Samling. 
54 Christopher Freeman and Luc Soete: Success and Failure in Innovation. The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 
3rd Edition, Routhledge, 1997.  
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6  CONCLUSION  
 
We have identified three radical innovations in Danish wind turbine history since 
1891: 
1) The la Cour turbine from 1891 
2) The Agricco turbine from 1918 
3) The Gedser turbine from 1957 
In all three cases the key persons were educated in natural science and with  
competence in engineering. The la Cour activities took place in an institutional set  
up at the Test Station in Askov, Jutland,  where he was a teacher in natural science  
at the Folk High School. The Test Station was funded to a substantial degree by  
government. The Agricco turbine was developed by two engineers from their own  
money and manufactured by a machine manufacturing firm according to their  
instructions. It was a technological success. It was not viable in commercial terms  
because resuming of the cheap coal and oil provisions from abroad after the end of  
First World War. Finally, the Gedser turbine was funded from Marshall Help fund  
and funds from the semi- public Electrical Utility Company, SEAS, in which  
Johannes Juul had worked many years before he became a pensioner after the end  
of Second World War.  
  
The Agricco turbine represented a break with the la Cour turbine because it  
incorporated the aerodynamic experiences from flight development especially from 
First World War. The Gedser turbine was a synthesis of all progress in wind 
turbine development from la Cour including the F. L. Smidth turbines installed 
during Second World War. The intention was to cancel all mistakes. 
Governmental support was decisive for two of the three mentioned radical  
innovations. However the most important fact to stress in all three cases was that  
the man or cooperative men with the important ideas had relatively high degree of  
autonomy to make decisions they found necessary or optimal naturally within  
financial restrictions.   
 
Poul la Cour’s radical innovation especially in its diffusion became a social 
success and to some degree a private economic success, not so much for la Cour as 
for the industrial partners manufacturing the most important components and 
modules. The Agricco turbine designed by Johannes Jensen and Poul Vinding in 
1919 was more effective than the la Cour turbine. However, the end of First World 
War opened up international trade routes including trade in coal and oil. That 
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meant that the advanced Agricco turbine could not be competitive in private 
economic sense. The production of it stopped in the end of 1920s. The Gedser 
turbine was not conceived as a commercial turbine. It was a test turbine and 
worked without breakdowns more than 10 years. The Danish nuclear lobby in 
electricity system and industry as a whole were against wind energy from different 
arguments – the cost price of electricity was about 100 percent above cost price of 
electricity from coal and oil. Additionally wind electricity was unstable because of 
the wind. Electricity engineers also preferred nuclear power electricity because it 
was stable. It was the First Energy Crisis 1973 -74, that changed the power balance 
between wind energy on one side and coal, oil and nuclear power on the other side. 
Costs of electricity generated from fossil fuels grew strongly compared with costs 
from wind electricity. The self-sufficiency problem in Danish energy provision 
was solved to a certain degree very fast compared with the alternative nuclear 
power.     
 
The three radical innovations mentioned in the text above were all based on 
research-based ideas. In the la Cour-case the innovator was himself an active 
scientist. However, it was the experimental work with wind tunnels, which was 
important to improve output of energy from wind. The Agricco-case represented 
incorporation of accumulated aerodynamic knowledge from Wright brothers until 
First World War. The blades were strongly inspired from wings in an airplane. 
However, there were several other important improvements as automatic yawing 
and pitch regulated blades. It was also the first wind turbine, which delivered AC 
electricity to the grid. We do not know very much in detail about the way Johannes 
Jensen and Poul Vinding worked. We know that they were educated engineers.  
Johannes Juul, the man behind the Gedser turbine did not had an academic 
education. He had an education as wind electrician from the la Cour education in 
Askov. After end of First World War, he had been educated as electrician and 
worked as such. Later on he worked with product development in SEAS (public 
utility in electricity). He became honorary member of one of Danish engineering 
association.  
 
The problem today is not lack of radical innovations – there are several concepts. 
However, there are still potential low hanging fruits from the Danish concept, 
which seem more promising than trying to develop a radical new concept. First 
they are not very risky. These potentialities are connected to turbine growth and 
offshore location.                                                                                                            
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It is interesting that all large turbine manufacturers today manufacture big turbines.  
The biggest wind turbines delivered by the three non-Chinese big manufactures  
today - Vestas,  Siemens Gamesa and  General Electric have effects about 8 – 9.5 
MW. However it is interesting to notice that the way different companies in  
different countries came from their start position in the end of 1970s, when they  
manufactured turbines with effect about 50 – 60 kW, to 2 – 3 MW, were very 
different. The American and the German approach was to go directly to 2 or 3 
MW. The rationale was that a big turbine with a factor 40 to 60 times higher effect  
than the standard state-of-the-art would represent much better economics   
compared with the small turbines. That strategy can be called the Big Bang  
strategy. The Danish Step-By-Step strategy to come from small turbines to bigger  
size was to grow gradual but fast to higher size. Compared with the Big Bang  
strategy many non-linarites in material and air flows were discovered in practice  
and could be alleviated from one generation of turbines to the next.  
 
Probably the different strategies between U.S.A. and  Germany on one side with  
their Big Bang and Denmark with its Step-By-Step can be explained from their  
firm structure – U.S.A. and  Germany have very big firms as Boing, Westinghouse  
and General Electric in U.S.A. and MAN and big electricity utilities in West  
Germany. In Denmark all wind turbine firms at that time were small and came  
from manufacturing of agricultural equipment where that market disappeared after  
a strong investment period from 1971 until 1975 a period in which Denmark  
became member of the Common Market with its strong subsidizing of agriculture.  
However history is a little bit more complex. The Gedser turbine which ran 1957 –  
67 had an effect of 200 kW. It ran without repair and maintenance and without  
accidents or serious down time because of security and backup systems. The stop  
of the turbine after a technical breakdown in a bearing in 1967 took place because  
pro-nuclear and anti-wind industrial and electricity company forces used the  
opportunity to stop it. From 1975 to 1978 after American NASA paid for repair.  
the turbine delivered important data for some additional years. Another big  
scale wind turbine was the Tvind turbine constructed with an effect of 2 MW 1975  
– 78. Because of oscillation problems it has never worked with more than 0.9 
MWh. When it began to run, it was the biggest turbine in the world. These two  
relative big turbines have been very important for Danish and global wind turbine  
development. However, they were not Big Bang turbines. And especially the  
Gedser turbine with its back up and security systems were humble towards  
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technical problems. The two Nibe turbines were more like Big Bang in Danish  
scale. They showed the same problems as in U.S.A. and Germany. 
 
The offshore location development started up with Vindeby wind farm consisting  
of 11 turbines in 1991. The location is in the Baltic Sea south of the island Lolland.  
SEAS the electricity utility company which also supported the Gedser turbine in  
1950s was one of the partners. However until 2017 offshore wind parks were  
located  in shallow waters (< 50 meter) in which the turbines can be erected on  
piles driven down in se sea bottom. In 2017 we have the first offshore wind installed   
at floating platforms North of Scotland with Norwegian Statoil as a main partner.                                              
 
 
A point of discussion is the question of continuous growth of turbines in 
combination of offshore location. The three manufacturers of the biggest turbines 
today mentioned above in addition with other manufacturers are working with 
design of still bigger turbines. Maybe growth of turbines will stop about 12 MW. 
Onshore because of NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) in most parts of Europe and 
offshore at shallow water close to coast. The problems with very big turbines 
located far away from coasts are difficulties to construct stable platforms. That 
means it can be more economic cost-efficient to locate a higher number of smaller 
turbines offshore than a smaller number in the wind park. 
 
Finally we have looked at learning from success and failure in innovation of wind  
turbines. We found that the American and the German Big Bang strategies in  
which the aim was to design and manufacture very big turbines with effect 40 – 60  
times bigger than what had been done before with success. Especially the German  
Growian project was a disaster, probably planned by German nuclear power lobby  
from industry and politics. The American projects represented much more mixed  
results and not a conspiracy against the aim to find out the possibility to design and  
manufacture big viable turbines. The technical problems came more from big  
business engineering arrogance. The NASA funding for refurbishment of the  
Gedser turbine shows serious interest to know something about wind turbines. 
 
The more humble attitude in Danish wind turbine companies learned from a long  
history starting with the la Cour turbines in 1891 and culminating with the Gedser  
turbine 1957 – 67 and its revival 1975 -78 was decisive for the 7 Danish companies  
erecting 25 percent of all wind turbines during the Californian Wind  Rush 1980 – 
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86. The well documented track of quality and very low down time of the Gedser  
turbine was what convinced the Californian investors and authorities. 
 
One more comment about learning from success and failure. When Vestas in 1979   
had developed their first turbine for the market, which was a Darrieus turbine, the  
result was not satisfactory. Vestas do not has told the outside world precisely what  
problems were. We have only been told that there were technical problems.  
However the firm bought from another firm by license a design according to the  
Danish Concept and learned in that way that the darling of many engineers - the  
Darrieus Concept - should not be trusted in. All the seven Danish wind turbine  
companies delivering to California 1981 – 86 were using the Danish Concept.   
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